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Abstract
We consider a two-person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables which are
related by invertible functions. They are denoted by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) for players A and
B.
We will show that the following four patterns of competition are equivalent, that is, they
yield the same outcome.
1. Player A and B choose 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 (competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)).
2. Player A and B choose 𝑡𝐴 and 𝑡𝐵 (competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
3. Player A and B choose 𝑡𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 (competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)).
4. Player A and B choose 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑡𝐵 (competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
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1 Introduction
We consider a two-person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables which are related
by invertible functions. They are denoted by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) for players A and B.
We will show that the following four patterns of competition are equivalent, that is, they
yield the same outcome.
1. Player A and B choose 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 (competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)).
2. Player A and B choose 𝑡𝐴 and 𝑡𝐵 (competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
3. Player A and B choose 𝑡𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 (competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)).
4. Player A and B choose 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑡𝐵 (competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
Relative proﬁt maximization in duopoly with diﬀerentiated goods is an example of zero-
sum game with two alternative strategic variables1. Each ﬁrm chooses its output or price. The
results of this paper imply that when ﬁrms in duopoly maximize their relative proﬁts, Cournot
and Bertrand equilibria are equivalent, and price-setting behavior and output-setting behavior
are equivalent2.
The key to our results is Lemma 4 in Section 6. This lemma implies that the maximin
strategies in four patterns of competition are equivalent, and the minimax strategies in four
patterns of competition are equivalent.
2 The model
Consider a two-person zero-sum game as follows. There are two players, A and B. They have
two sets of alternative strategic variables, (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ∈ 𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵 and (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) ∈ 𝑇𝐴 × 𝑇𝐵. 𝑆𝐴, 𝑆𝐵,
𝑇𝐴 and 𝑇𝐵 are compact sets in metric spaces. The relations of them are represented by
𝑠𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), and 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵).
(𝑓𝐴, 𝑓𝐵) is a continuous invertible function, and so it is a one-to-one and onto function. We
denote
𝑡𝐴 = 𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵), and 𝑡𝐵 = 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵).
(𝑔𝐴, 𝑔𝐵) is also a continuous invertible function. The payoﬀ function of Player A is 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)
and the payoﬀ function of Player B is 𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). Since the game is zero-sum, we have 𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) =
−𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). 𝑢𝐴 is upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave on 𝑆𝐴 for each 𝑠𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝐵 (or each
𝑡𝐵 ∈ 𝑇𝐵), upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave on 𝑇𝐴 for each 𝑡𝐵 ∈ 𝑇𝐵 (or each 𝑠𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝐵),
1A game of relative proﬁt maximization in duopoly is a zero-sum game because the sum of the relative proﬁts
of ﬁrms is zero.
2About relative proﬁt maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato
(2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a),
Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997).
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and lower semi-continuous and quasi-convex on 𝑆𝐵 for each 𝑠𝐴 ∈ 𝑆𝐴 (or each 𝑡𝐴 ∈ 𝑇𝐴), lower
semi-continuous and quasi-convex on 𝑇𝐵 for each 𝑡𝐴 ∈ 𝑇𝐴 (or each 𝑠𝐴 ∈ 𝑆𝐴).
We note that any value of 𝑠𝐴 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑡𝐴 given 𝑠𝐵, any value
of 𝑡𝐴 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑠𝐴 given 𝑠𝐵, any value of 𝑡𝐵 can be realized
by appropriately choosing 𝑠𝐵 given 𝑡𝐴, and any value of 𝑠𝐵 can be realized by appropriately
choosing 𝑡𝐵 given 𝑡𝐴
3.
3 Competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)
First consider competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). Let 𝑠
∗
𝐴 and 𝑠
∗
𝐵 be the values of 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 which, respec-
tively, maximizes 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) given 𝑠
∗
𝐵 and maximizes 𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) given 𝑠
∗
𝐴. Then,
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) for all 𝑠𝐴 ≠ 𝑠
∗
𝐴,
and
𝑢𝐵(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) ≥ 𝑢𝐵(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) for all 𝑠𝐵 ≠ 𝑠
∗
𝐵.
Since 𝑢𝐵 = −𝑢𝐴, this is rewritten as
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵), for all 𝑠𝐵 ≠ 𝑠
∗
𝐵.
Thus, we obtain
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) for all 𝑠𝐴 ≠ 𝑠
∗
𝐴, and all 𝑠𝐵 ≠ 𝑠
∗
𝐵.
This is equivalent to
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) = max𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) = min𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵).
(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) is a Nash equilibrium of competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) game.
On the other hand, by the Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler
(2005)) we have
𝑣𝑠𝐴 ≡ max𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≡ 𝑣
𝑠
𝐵.
We can show the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The following three statements are equivalent.
1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) game.
2. The following relation holds.
𝑣𝑠𝐴 ≡ max𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≡ min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑣
𝑠
𝐵.
3Also any value of 𝑠𝐴 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑡𝐴 given 𝑡𝐵, any value of 𝑡𝐴 can be realized by
appropriately choosing 𝑠𝐴 given 𝑡𝐵, any value of 𝑡𝐵 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑠𝐵 given 𝑠𝐴,
and any value of 𝑠𝐵 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑡𝐵 given 𝑠𝐴.
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3. There exists a real number v𝑠, 𝑠𝑚𝐴 ∈ 𝑆𝐴 and 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝐵 such that
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
𝑚
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≥ v𝑠 for any 𝑠𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝐵, and 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵) ≤ v𝑠 for any 𝑠𝐴 ∈ 𝑆𝐴. (1)
Proof. (1 → 2)
Let 𝑠∗𝐴 and 𝑠
∗
𝐵 be the equilibrium strategies. Then,
𝑣𝑠𝐵 = min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≤ max𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵)
= min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≤ max𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑣
𝑠
𝐴.
On the other hand, min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵), thenmax𝑠𝐴 min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≤ max𝑠𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵),
and so max𝑠𝐴 min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≤ min𝑠𝐵 max𝑠𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). Thus, 𝑣
𝑠
𝐴 ≤ 𝑣
𝑠
𝐵, and we have 𝑣
𝑠
𝐴 = 𝑣
𝑠
𝐵.
(2 → 3)
Let 𝑠𝑚𝐴 = argmax𝑠𝐴 min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) (themaximin strategy), 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵 = argmin𝑠𝐵 max𝑠𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)
(the minimax strategy), and let v𝑠 = 𝑣𝑠𝐴 = 𝑣
𝑠
𝐵. Then, we have
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
𝑚
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≥ min𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
𝑚
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = max𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = v𝑠
= min
𝑠𝐵
max
𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = max𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵).
(3 → 1)
From (1)
𝑢𝐴(𝑠
𝑚
𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≥ v𝑠 ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵) for all 𝑠𝐴 ∈ 𝑆𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝐵.
Putting 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑠
𝑚
𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵, we see v𝑠 = 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
𝑚
𝐴, 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵) and (𝑠
𝑚
𝐴, 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵) is an equilibrium.
We have (𝑠𝑚𝐴, 𝑠
𝑚
𝐵) = (𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵). Denote the value of 𝑡𝐴 which is derived from 𝑡𝐴 = 𝑔𝐴(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵)
by 𝑡∗𝐴, and denote the value of 𝑡𝐵 which is derived from 𝑡𝐵 = 𝑔𝐵(𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵) by 𝑡
∗
𝐵.
4 Competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
Next consider competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵). Substituting 𝑓𝐴 and 𝑓𝐵 into 𝑢𝐴 and 𝑢𝐵 yields
𝑢𝐴 = 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)), 𝑢𝐵 = 𝑢𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
Let ̃𝑡𝐴 and ̃𝑡𝐵 be the values of 𝑡𝐴 and 𝑡𝐵 which, respectively, maximizes 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵))
given ̃𝑡𝐵 and maximizes 𝑢𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) given ̃𝑡𝐴. Then,
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵)) for all 𝑡𝐴 ≠ ̃𝑡𝐴,
and
𝑢𝐵(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐵(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) for all 𝑡𝐵 ≠ ̃𝑡𝐵.
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Since 𝑢𝐵 = −𝑢𝐴, this is rewritten as
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵)) for all 𝑡𝐵 ≠ ̃𝑡𝐵.
Thus, we obtain
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵))
for all 𝑡𝐴 ≠ ̃𝑡𝐴, and all 𝑡𝐵 ≠ ̃𝑡𝐵.
This is equivalent to
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵)) = max𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵))
= min
𝑡𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
Similarly to Lemma 1 we can show.
Lemma 2. The following three statements are equivalent.
1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) game.
2. The following relation holds.
𝑣𝑡𝐴 ≡ max𝑡𝐴
min
𝑡𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) = min𝑡𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) ≡ 𝑣
𝑡
𝐵.
3. There exists a real number v𝑡, 𝑡𝑚𝐴 ∈ 𝑇𝐴 and 𝑡
𝑚
𝐵 ∈ 𝑇𝐵 such that
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡
𝑚
𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡
𝑚
𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) ≥ v𝑡 for any 𝑡𝐵 ∈ 𝑇𝐵, and 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡
𝑚
𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡
𝑚
𝐵)) ≤ v𝑡
for any 𝑡𝐴 ∈ 𝑇𝐴.
We have (𝑡𝑚𝐴, 𝑡
𝑚
𝐵) = ( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵). Denote the value of 𝑠𝐴 which is derived from 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵) by
̃𝑠𝐴, and denote the value of 𝑠𝐵 which is derived from 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵) by ̃𝑠𝐵.
5 Competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)
Next consider competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). we have
𝑠𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)), 𝑡𝐵 = 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵).
The payoﬀs of Player A and B are written as
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵), 𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑢𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵).
Let ̄𝑡𝐴 and ̄𝑠𝐵 be the values of 𝑡𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 which, respectively, maximizes 𝑢𝐴 given ̄𝑠𝐵 and max-
imizes 𝑢𝐵 given ̄𝑡𝐴. Then,
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), ̄𝑠𝐵) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), ̄𝑠𝐵) for all 𝑡𝐴 ≠ ̄𝑡𝐴,
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and
𝑢𝐵(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), ̄𝑠𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐵(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)) for all 𝑠𝐵 ≠ ̄𝑠𝐵.
Since 𝑢𝐵 = −𝑢𝐴, this is rewritten as
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), ̄𝑠𝐵)) for all 𝑠𝐵 ≠ ̄𝑠𝐵.
Thus, we obtain
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), ̄𝑠𝐵)) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), ̄𝑠𝐵))
for all 𝑡𝐴 ≠ ̄𝑡𝐴, and all 𝑠𝐵 ≠ ̄𝑠𝐵.
This is equivalent to
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), ̄𝑠𝐵) = max𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), ̄𝑠𝐵) = min𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵).
Similarly to Lemma 1 we can show.
Lemma 3. The following three statements are equivalent.
1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) game.
2. The following relation holds.
𝑣𝑡𝑠𝐴 ≡ max𝑡𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) ≡ 𝑣
𝑡𝑠
𝐵 .
3. There exists a real number v𝑡𝑠, 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝐴 ∈ 𝑇𝐴 and 𝑠
𝑡𝑠
𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝐵 such that
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡
𝑡𝑠
𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) ≥ v𝑡𝑠 for any 𝑠𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝐵, and 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠
𝑡𝑠
𝐵) ≤ v𝑡𝑠 for any 𝑡𝐴 ∈ 𝑇𝐴.
Wehave (𝑡𝑡𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
𝑡𝑠
𝐵) = ( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑠𝐵). Denote the value of 𝑠𝐴which is derived from 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, ̄𝑠𝐵))
by ̄𝑠𝐴, and denote the value of 𝑡𝐵 which is derived from 𝑡𝐵 = 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) ̄𝑠𝐵), by ̄𝑡𝐵. Then, ̄𝑡𝐴
and ̄𝑠𝐵 are written as
̄𝑡𝐴 = 𝑔𝐴( ̄𝑠𝐴, ̄𝑠𝐵), and ̄𝑠𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑡𝐵).
6 Equivalence of four patterns of competition
In this section we show the equivalence of four patterns of competition. First we show the
following lemma which is key to our results.
Lemma 4. The following relations hold.
1. max𝑡𝐴 min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = max𝑠𝐴 min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵).
6
2. min𝑠𝐵 max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑡𝐵 max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
Proof. 1. min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) is the minimum of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to 𝑠𝐵 given 𝑡𝐴. Let
𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴) = argmin𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵), and ﬁx the value of 𝑠𝐴 at 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴))).
Then, we have
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴))), 𝑠𝐵)
≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴))), 𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴)) = min𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵),
where min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴))), 𝑠𝐵) is the minimum of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to 𝑠𝐵 given
the value of 𝑠𝐴 at 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴))). This holds for any 𝑡𝐴. Thus,
max
𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴,𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴,𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴)))
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴))), 𝑠𝐵) ≤ max𝑡𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵).
Any value of 𝑠𝐴 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑡𝐴 given 𝑠𝐵 as 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑡𝐴))).
Therefore, this can be rewritten as
max
𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) ≤ max𝑡𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵). (2)
On the other hand, min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) is the minimum of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to 𝑠𝐵 given 𝑠𝐴.
Let 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴) = argmin𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵), and ﬁx the value of 𝑡𝐴 at 𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)). Then, we
have
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)), 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴))), 𝑠𝐵)
≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)), 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴))), 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)) = 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)) = min𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵),
wheremin𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)), 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴))), 𝑠𝐵) is theminimumof 𝑢𝐴with respect
to 𝑠𝐵 given the value of 𝑡𝐴 at 𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)). This holds for any 𝑠𝐴. Thus,
max
𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴,𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴))
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)), 𝑔𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴))), 𝑠𝐵) ≤ max𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵)
Any value of 𝑡𝐴 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑠𝐴 given 𝑠𝐵 as 𝑡𝐴 = 𝑔𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵(𝑠𝐴)).
Therefore, this can be rewritten as
max
𝑡𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) ≤ max𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). (3)
Combining (2) and (3), we get
max
𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = max𝑡𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵).
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2. max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) is the maximum of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to 𝑡𝐴 given 𝑠𝐵. Let 𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵) =
argmax𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵), and ﬁx the value of 𝑡𝐵 at 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵). Then, we
have
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)), 𝑠𝐵)
= max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)))
≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)), 𝑠𝐵) = max𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵),
where max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)), 𝑠𝐵) is the maximum of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to
𝑡𝐴 given the value of 𝑡𝐵 at 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)). This holds for any 𝑠𝐵. Thus,
min
𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵),𝑡𝐵),𝑠𝐵))
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵)))
≥ min
𝑠𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵).
Any value of 𝑡𝐵 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑠𝐵 given 𝑡𝐴 as 𝑡𝐵 = 𝑔𝐵(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑠𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵).
Therefore, this can be rewritten as
min
𝑡𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) ≥ min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵). (4)
On the other hand, max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) is the maximum of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to
𝑡𝐴 given 𝑡𝐵. Let 𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵) = argmax𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)), and ﬁx the value of 𝑠𝐵 at
𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵), 𝑡𝐵). Then, we have
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵), 𝑡𝐵))
≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵), 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵), 𝑡𝐵)) = max𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)),
where max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵), 𝑡𝐵)) is the maximum of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to 𝑡𝐴 given
the value of 𝑠𝐵 at 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵), 𝑡𝐵). This holds for any 𝑡𝐵. Thus,
min
𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵),𝑡𝐵)
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵), 𝑡𝐵)) ≥ min𝑡𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
Any value of 𝑠𝐵 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑡𝐵 given 𝑡𝐴 as 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴(𝑡𝐵), 𝑡𝐵).
Therefore, this can be rewritten as
min
𝑠𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) ≥ min𝑡𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)). (5)
Combining (4) and (5), we get
min
𝑡𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) = min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵).
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Now we show the following propositions.
Proposition 1. 1. Competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) are equivalent.
2. Competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) are equivalent.
Proof. 1. We show that ( ̄𝑠𝐴, ̄𝑠𝐵) satisﬁes the conditions for (𝑠
∗
𝐴, 𝑠
∗
𝐵). From Lemma 3
max
𝑡𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠𝐴, ̄𝑠𝐵).
Since any value of 𝑠𝐴 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑡𝐴 given 𝑠𝐵, we have
max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = max𝑠𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) for any 𝑠𝐵. Thus,
min
𝑠𝐵
max
𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠𝐴, ̄𝑠𝐵).
FromLemma 4we havemax𝑡𝐴 min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = max𝑠𝐴 min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵). There-
fore, we obtain
max
𝑠𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑠𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠𝐴, ̄𝑠𝐵).
This is 2 of Lemma 1.
2. We show that ( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑡𝐵) satisﬁes the conditions for ( ̃𝑡𝐴, ̃𝑡𝐵). From Lemma 3
max
𝑡𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑠𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑡𝐵)).
Since any value of 𝑡𝐵 can be realized by appropriately choosing 𝑠𝐵 given 𝑡𝐴, we have
min𝑠𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑡𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) for any 𝑡𝐴. Thus,
max
𝑡𝐴
min
𝑡𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) = max𝑡𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑡𝐵)).
FromLemma 4we havemin𝑠𝐵 max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑠𝐵) = min𝑡𝐵 max𝑡𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)).
Therefore, we obtain
max
𝑡𝐴
min
𝑡𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)) = min𝑡𝐵
max
𝑡𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵))
= 𝑢𝐴(𝑓𝐴( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑡𝐵), 𝑓𝐵( ̄𝑡𝐴, ̄𝑡𝐵)).
This is 2 of Lemma 2.
Exchanging A with B we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 2. 1. Competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) are equivalent.
2. Competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) and competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) are equivalent.
Finally, from these results we get
Proposition 3. Competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) are equivalent.
Therefore, all of four patterns of competition are equivalent.
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7 Concluding Remark
We have shown that in a two-person zero-sum game with two sets of alternative strategic vari-
ables, any pattern of competition is equivalent, and any selection of strategic variables is equiv-
alent. We want to extend the results of this paper to a symmetric 𝑛-person zero-sum game4.
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